The Effects of Compulsory Military Service Exemption on Education and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment by Torun, Huzeyfe & Tumen, Semih
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Effects of Compulsory Military
Service Exemption on Education and
Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from
a Natural Experiment
Huzeyfe Torun and Semih Tumen
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
29. January 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61722/
MPRA Paper No. 61722, posted 30. January 2015 14:24 UTC
The Effects of Compulsory Military Service Exemption
on Education and Labor Market Outcomes:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment∗
Huzeyfe Torun †
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Semih Tumen ‡
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
January 30, 2015
Abstract
Based on a law enacted in November 1999, males born on or before December 31st 1972 are given the
option to benefit from a paid exemption from the compulsory military service in Turkey. Exploiting this
natural experiment, we devise an empirical strategy to estimate the intention-to-treat effect of this paid
exemption on the education and labor market outcomes of the individuals in the target group. We find
that the paid exemption reform reduces the years of schooling among males who are eligible to benefit
from the reform relative to the ineligible ones. In particular, the probability of receiving a college degree
or above falls among the eligible males. The result is robust to alternative estimation strategies. We find
no reduction in education when we implement the same exercises with (i) data on females and (ii) placebo
reform dates. The interpretation is that the reform has reduced the incentives to continue education for
the purpose of deferring military service. We also find suggestive evidence that the paid exemption reform
reduces the labor income for males in the target group. The reduction in earnings is likely due to the
reduction in education.
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1 Introduction
There is a reviving interest in understanding the impacts of compulsory military service on
education and labor market outcomes. In theory, there are costs and benefits of compulsory
military service. It is costly for several reasons including human capital depreciation, foregone
labor market experience, and foregone earnings. These costs can get larger as the duration of
service increases. It also has potential benefits. It is often argued that military service provides
unique opportunities to equip individuals with valuable technical skills and discipline that may
lead to increased productivity in civilian life. Besides its effect on labor market outcomes,
compulsory military service may indirectly affect educational attainment of individuals. In
most countries, military service is delayed for the ones who are enrolled in school. Therefore,
individuals may attain higher education to avoid or postpone their military service. Increased
education may, in turn, raise earnings capacity. Overall, the net impact on education is
likely to be negative, whereas the net impact on labor market outcomes is ambiguous. The
empirical evidence is also mixed with some studies suggesting that abolishing compulsory
military service can have positive effects on labor market outcomes, while others reporting
zero or negative effects.
In this paper, we study the impact of a law—enacted on November 1999—offering the option to
benefit from a one-time paid exemption from the compulsory military service in Turkey. Males
born on or before December 31st 1972—27 years old and above at the time of the reform—are
the eligible group, while the ones born on or after January 1st 1973 are ineligible. The amount
of the required payment is 15,000 Deutschmark—20,000 Deutschmark for males above 40 years
old.1 The timing of the reform is purely exogenous, because the main motivation behind the
reform is to partially compensate the deficit due to the devastating earthquake that took
place in Izmit—a province close to Istanbul—on August 1999. Based on this reform, a male
born on December 31st 1972 is offered the option to relax his military service constraints
in exchange for some cash, while another one born 24 hours later is not offered the same
option. The duration of compulsory military service, which was 9–18 months at the time
1Based on the exchange rates as of the reform date, 15,000 Deutschmark corresponds to approximately 8,000 US Dollars.
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of the reform, increases the appeal of the paid exemption option. This natural experiment
enables us to empirically assess whether the education and labor market outcomes of the ones
in the treatment group differ from the outcomes of those in the control group.
We use the 2004–2013 waves of the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey micro-level data
sets in our empirical analysis. We cannot observe details on military service; so, whether
the individual has benefited from paid exemption or not is unobserved to the econometrician.
Instead, we observe the birth dates of the survey respondents, so that we can clearly distinguish
between the eligible ones from the ineligible ones. Thus, within a narrowly defined birth-date
interval centered around the reform date, there exist males who have deferred their military
obligations both on the left- and right-hand sides of the reform date. Part of the males born
before the cutoff date have chosen to benefit from the exemption. As a result, comparing
the outcomes on both sides of the cutoff date with each other identifies the impact of the
reform. Although the treatment and control groups are randomly assigned, not everyone in
the treatment group used the option. The quasi-experimental design is set up based on the
initial assignment and not on the treatment eventually received. Due to imperfect compliance,
our estimates should be interpreted as the “intention-to-treat” effects.
We apply three different econometric specifications: OLS, difference in differences, and triple
difference. In all of these exercises, we consistently report that paid exemption significantly
reduces the total years of completed education. Our estimates suggest a reduction in the range
of 0.15–0.20 years, on average. We interpret this result as an evidence of decreased incentives
to continue education for males in the treatment group relative to those in the control group.
We further present evidence that the reduction in the years of completed schooling comes
from the decline in the probability of receiving a college degree or above. This implies that
continuing education is partly seen as a means to defer military service; thus, in the absence
of compulsory military service, part of the males would not stay enrolled in college or in
graduate education. We also present suggestive evidence that the labor income also tends to
decline within the eligible group. Thinking the results on education and earnings together, the
reduction in earnings is likely due to the reduction in education. To check the robustness of
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these results, we perform two different empirical exercises. First, we perform the same set of
regressions for females. We find no effect for both education and earnings. Second, we set two
different placebo treatment dates and perform regressions for males as if the paid exemption
reform is implemented in these dates rather than the original date. Again, we report no effect
for both education and earnings.
We would like to mention at this stage that the natural experiment that we analyze targets
potentially highly-educated males. Based on the brief description of the reform provided
above, the ones who are 27 years old or older have been given the option to benefit from
paid exemption. In this group of males, the ones who have deferred their military service are
likely to be either enrolled in college or in graduate education. In this sense, we analyze the
impact of paid exemption on the outcomes of better-educated individuals. Our findings also
confirm this view: the paid-exemption reform reduces probability of receiving a college degree
or above suggesting that enrolling in college or graduate school partially serves as a means for
deferring national service in Turkey.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on compulsory military
service and relates/compares our paper to the relevant work in the literature. Section 3
describes the institutional environment in Turkey. Section 4 provides a definition of our data
and presents the details of our identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the results. Section
6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a large literature investigating the impact of compulsory military service on various
outcomes. Research on compulsory military service is useful for policy, because there is an
ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of replacing the compulsory military service with a
voluntary enrollment system. From our vantage point, papers in this literature can be grouped
under two categories based on their main outcome of interest: (i) studies focusing on wage and
employment outcomes and (ii) those focusing on educational outcomes. Papers in the first
4
category estimate the impact of both peacetime and wartime military conscription on civilian
wage and employment outcomes. The results, however, are mixed and there is no consensus
in the literature about the impact of compulsory military service on wage and employment
outcomes. Using the draft lottery for the Vietnam War as a natural experiment, Angrist
(1990) shows that veteran status has reduced civilian earnings considerably in the United
States. However, the subsequent studies find that the earnings gap between veterans and non-
veterans has diminished quickly over time [Angrist and Chen (2011), Angrist, Chen, and Song
(2011)]. Angrist and Krueger (1994) report that the World War II veterans earn no more than
non-veterans. In one of the earliest studies on this topic, Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995)
find that conscription in the Netherlands is associated with around a 5 percent loss in annual
earnings relative to those who did not serve in the military and this result persists even after
correcting for potential channels of selectivity. Bauer, Bender, Paloyo, and Schmidt (2012)
show using a regression discontinuity design that compulsory military service has virtually
zero effects on labor market outcomes in Germany. A similar result is documented by Grenet,
Hart, and Roberts (2011) using British data. Card and Cardoso (2009) find using data from
Portugal that peacetime conscription has a positive effect on the labor market outcomes of
low-educated males, while its effect on better-educated males is nil.
Papers in the second category investigate the role of compulsory military service in changing
the schooling decisions of individuals. Card and Lemieux (2001) find that draft avoidance
behavior raised college attendance rates by 4-6 percentage points in the United states in
late 1960s. Maurin and Xenogiani (2007) document that the reform abolishing compulsory
conscription in France has reduced time spent in school among males. They argue that
compulsory conscription provides incentives for males to spend extra time in school, which, in
turn, leads to increased earnings potential. Di Pietro (2013) shows, on the other hand, that
abolishing compulsory military service in Italy did not have any effect on college enrollment
rates.2
2There are also several papers, including De Tray (1982), Angrist (1993), Bound and Turner (2002), Simon, Negrusa, and
Warner (2010), and Barr (2014), arguing that various waves of the G.I. Bill may have led to increased educational attainment
among veterans.
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Our paper is most closely related to the papers in the second strand. The closest paper to
ours in terms of the nature of the results is Maurin and Xenogiani (2007). Similar to their
paper, we find that being exempt from the compulsory military service reduces the years of
completed education and labor market earnings. We also provide suggestive evidence that the
decline in earnings is possibly due to decreased completed education. Enrollment to college or
graduate school is effectively used by some males to defer military service. Part of the males
in this group do not continue education after being exempt from military service. This finding
is also related to Card and Lemieux (2001) in the sense that it specifies college enrollment
as a means to defer/avoid military service. Our paper contributes to the literature in three
ways. First, it provides additional evidence on the impact of compulsory military service on
education and labor market outcomes by using a natural experiment—i.e., a paid-exemption
reform—that targets higher-educated individuals. This is a unique exercise in the sense that
there is no quasi-experimental evidence in the literature targeting specifically the ones who
are more likely to defer their national service by college enrollment. Second, this is the first
paper in the literature documenting the impact of a paid exemption from compulsory military
service. Finally, along with Torun (2014), this is one of the first papers attempting to estimate
with micro-level data the impact of compulsory military service on education and labor market
outcomes in Turkey.
There are several other studies focusing on different aspects of the link between compulsory
military service and labor market outcomes. Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011) docu-
ment that conscription increases the likelihood of developing a crime record. Papers including
Bedard and Deschenes (2006), Dobkin and Shabani (2009), and Autor, Duggan, and Lyle
(2011) report negative impact of conscription on health outcomes. Torun (2014) shows using
cross-country micro data that anticipation of compulsory military service reduces the likeli-
hood of labor market participation among young individuals.
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3 Institutional Setting
3.1 Military Service in Turkey
This section describes the general institutional features of the compulsory military service in
Turkey. The compulsory military service system was introduced in the early 20th century
in Turkey. Turkey still relies on the compulsory military service system to supplement the
professional armed forces with qualified personnel. The system requires all males above 20
years old—with good health, normal BMI values, and no disabilities—to enlist in the military.3
Within the year they turn 19, males from a particular birth cohort are called for medical and
psychological examinations. Males with temporary health problems are deferred from service.
Unlike the case in some other countries, there is no occupation-based exemption, which keeps
the number of permanent exemptions at reasonably low levels. For example, police and firemen
are not exempt from the military service. Yet there are other forms of exemptions. For
example, a male whose brother lost his life during military service or was seriously injured is
exempt from compulsory military service. The laws do not allow conscientious objection.
Males that are physically and mentally fit are not necessarily called up immediately. Those
who are enrolled in college or graduate school can defer their military service until age 29.
High school graduates and the ones with two-year college degrees can defer their service until
the age 22 and 23, respectively. Males with four-year college degree can defer their service up
to two years following graduation. The law enacted in November 1999 offers males, who are
born in 1972 or before, the option to benefit from one-time paid exemption from compulsory
military service. Thus, 27 year-old or older males, who had not already completed their
military service, could benefit from the exemption option. Given the deferment regulations,
most males, who had not served until age 27, must be either enrolled in higher education
(college and above) or must be a new college graduate.4
The duration of compulsory military service has been changed several times in Turkey through-
3Females are exempt from compulsory military service in Turkey, but they are allowed to join the army as professional military
officers. Males with severe health problems, extreme BMI values, and disabilities are permanently exempted from the military
service.
4There may also be non-college graduate males, who avoided the service without a legitimate excuse for deferral. These are
called the draft evaders.
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out the 20th century and the maximum duration is reached during the World War II era.
Between 1995 and 2003, the duration of service was 18 months. By a law enacted in 2003, the
duration of compulsory military service was reduced from 18 to 15 months. The most recent
change was made in October 2013, which shortened the duration of service form 15 months
to 12 months—effective January 2014. Since we investigate the effect of paid exemption law
in 1999, the relevant duration of compulsory military service for our analysis is 18 months.
It should be noted that the duration of military service also depends on the higher education
status. From 1995 to 2003, males with two-year college degrees and the ones with lower
degrees served for full term, 18 months, as enlisted soldiers. The 18-month military service as
an ordinary conscript is a difficult task for most young males. A four-year college graduate
serves under more preferable conditions. Those who have four-year college degree either serve
full term, 18 months, as an officer candidate among military officers or they serve half term, 9
months, among enlisted soldiers. The final allocation of college graduates between 18-month
service and 9-month service depends on both individual preferences and the necessities of the
army. Males who studied in certain fields, such as medicine or engineering, are more likely to
be assigned 18-month officer candidate service. Unlike other conscripts, college graduates who
serve for 18 months receive a monthly salary.5 Officer candidates also have the option to live
outside the barracks with or without their families. On top of these, they have the privilege
of holding a rank in the armed forces. Four-year college graduates, who serve for 9 months
among enlisted privates, also have advantages. They are not paid, yet they serve for the half
term. Moreover, although 9-month serving college graduates are not among officers, they are
usually assigned easier tasks that are compatible with their degrees.
There are pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to education including higher wages, better
health, and prestige. For those who are at the margin of attending a four-year college, a more
comfortable military service is another incentive in Turkey. Anecdotal evidence shows that
especially among two-year college graduates, a comfortable military service is an incentive for
attending a four-year college. Also a lot of males attend open four-year colleges to postpone
5In practice, all non-college graduate conscripts also receive extremely small, symbolic salaries. Yet, the salary of the candidate
officers is approximately equal to a teacher’s salary, around $1000.
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their military service and make the military service easier when they graduate. We argue and
empirically show that the paid exemption law in 1999 takes away this incentive and reduces
the college graduation rate among males born before the cutoff date of birth compared to
males born after the cutoff date of birth.
All conscripts receive basic training for around two months and, after that, they are allocated
to their divisions for active duty. The unit in the military that a male joins and the region
where he serves are determined by the military. The majority of males with no college degree
are assigned to the army, and relatively fewer males are assigned to the Air Force and the
Navy. Although the exact number of conscripts has varied over time, the Turkish armed forces
comprise around 200,000 officers and professional soldiers and around 400,000 conscripts.
3.2 The 1999 Paid Exemption Reform
Since the establishment of compulsory military service in Turkey, a number of temporary laws
have provided the option of paid exemption to those who are far older than the conscription
age. Each regulation allowed for suitable males to apply for paid exemption within a couple
of months after the ratification of the law. The timing of these temporary laws is exogenous
and there is not a predetermined rule regarding the amount of payment and the cutoff age for
eligibility. The recent laws came into force in 1987, 1992, 1999, 2011, and 2014. The cutoff
ages were 40 in 1987, 27 in 1992 and 1999, 29 in 2011, and 27 in 2014. The payments were
around $8,000 in 1999, $16,000 in 2011 and $8,000 in 2014. The number of actual participants
is relatively low for the 1987 and 1992 laws. The 2011 and 2014 laws are quite new and the
available information is not enough to assess the impact of the reform on educational and
labor market outcomes of the eligible males. The 1999 is particularly suitable for empirical
analysis since (i) the number of males who have actually benefited from the exemption is
relatively large and (ii) we have quite rich information regarding the educational and labor
market outcomes of the eligible ones.
As mentioned above, the timing of the law is exogenous. The 1999 law, the focus of this article,
came into force after a devastating earthquake in Izmit in August 1999. The motivation was
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to raise extra revenue necessary for recovery of the victims of the earthquake. The paid
exemption law came into force in November 1999. The law gave the option to males, who had
not yet completed their military service and were not in the army at the time of the reform, to
pay 15,000 Deutschmark (approximately $8,000) and serve for 21 days instead of a full term.6
Males who were born on or before December 31st 1972 were given this option. The cutoff time
of birth corresponded to the age 27 at the time. The cutoff time of birth was determined in
coordination with the armed forces considering the personnel requirements of the army at the
time. So, a significant portion of the actual participants were either enrolled in college or new
college graduates. The required payment was allowed to be paid in four installments. Since
it was a temporary law, eligible males were supposed to apply for the paid exemption in the
following six months after the enactment of the law.
Although, the law significantly shortened the service time, it did not make it zero. The
participants of 1999 paid exemption served for 21 days—during which they received basic
military training. Remember that in the absence of the paid exemption law, non-college
graduates serve for 18 months and college graduates serve for 9 or 18 months. So a 21-day
service is considerably shorter than the normal duration of the military service. For those who
benefit from the paid exemption law, more favorable conditions during military service is no
more an incentive for receiving a college degree.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
We use the 2004–2013 waves of the Household Labor Force Survey (LFS) conducted by the
Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). Each survey covers about 150,000 households and
500,000 individuals annually, and reports their demographic characteristics and detailed labor
market outcomes. The LFS is a micro-level, nationally-representative, and publicly-available
data set. It is the main data source for the national labor force and employment statistics for
6For males who are above 40, the payment was 20,000 Deutschmark. Yet, there were very few males who had not served until
the age 40.
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Turkey. In order to distinguish between those who were affected by the law and those who
were not, we obtained additional files from TURKSTAT, which are not publicly available, on
the year of birth and month of birth of respondents and merged them with the original data.7
The age variable would be an inaccurate measure to define eligibility.
The paid exemption law affected those who were born on or before December 31, 1972. We
restrict our sample to individuals born around the cutoff date in any of the survey years from
2004 to 2013. Males who were born in 1972 were at the age of 32 in 2004 and 41 in 2013. So the
sample consists of prime age males and females who have already completed their schooling
decisions. Table (1) provides the sample statistics for the main variables, separately for males
and females for the baseline sample used in this paper.
The age variable in the data shows the completed age of individuals. Around 3.3 percent
of our baseline sample is missing year of birth information. We drop those missing year of
birth and analyze a sample of 549,972 individuals aged 27–44 from survey years 2004–2013.
The variable for real earnings shows the monthly wages and includes overtime work payments
and bonuses—the earnings regressions include only the salaried workers. The real earnings
are denominated in 2004 Turkish Liras. The non-response rate for wage information among
salaried workers is quite small, at 4.5 percent. A detailed description of the key variables used
in the empirical analysis is provided in the Data Appendix.
4.2 Identification Strategy
The paid exemption reform has a sharp cutoff date: males born on or before 31 December
1972 are eligible and those born after this date are ineligible. The reform date is the end
of 1999, while our data set covers the period 2004–2013. We have information on the ex
post educational and labor market outcomes. We do not observe who have actually benefited
from the reform and who have not. We observe the birth dates of the survey respondents
as month-year pairs and we are only able to distinguish between the eligible versus ineligible
males. Think of a narrowly defined birth-date interval centered around the cutoff date. There
7We would like to thank the staff in the Labor Force Statistics Department of TURKSTAT.
11
exist males who have deferred their military obligations both on the left- and right-hand sides
of the cutoff date. Part of the males born before the cutoff date have chosen to benefit from
the exemption. In other words, although the treatment and control groups are randomly
assigned, not everyone in the treatment group has benefited from the reform. Our quasi-
experimental design is based on the initial assignment and not on the treatment eventually
received. Our estimates should be interpreted as the “intention-to-treat” (ITT) effects, since
there is imperfect compliance within the treatment group.
The ITT estimation is often regarded in the program evaluation literature as a solution to
the imperfect compliance problem [Fisher, Dixon, Herson, Frankowski, Hearron, and Peace
(1990)]. ITT analysis strictly depends on the randomized treatment assignment and ignores
all sorts of non-compliance in the post-protocol period. Because of this feature, it is some-
times described with the phrase “once randomized, always analyzed” [Hennekens, Buring, and
Mayrent (1987)]. The ITT effect also tends to be smaller than the true average treatment
effect (i.e., it likely underestimates the true causal effect), because of imperfect compliance
[Angrist and Pischke (2008)]. Thus, although the ITT can be regarded as a lower-bound esti-
mate of the impact, it is more policy relevant than the average treatment effect parameter in
the empirical analysis of voluntary programs [Bloom (2008)].
We try three different empirical specifications each relying on different identifying assump-
tions: OLS, difference in differences, and triple difference. Below we describe each of these
specifications in detail. Before doing so, we would like to clarify one point. Given that we
have a sharp cutoff date, it sounds natural to try a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to
identify the impact of the reform on the outcomes of interest. However, we avoid RDD based
on an important observation. The cutoff date separates the ones born in December from those
born in January. It is well-known that education and labor income is correlated with season
of birth not only through the potential interactions between season of birth and compulsory
schooling laws [see, e.g., Angrist and Krueger (1991)], but also through the fact that children
born toward the end of the year are much more likely to have wealthier and better-educated
parents than children born early in the year [Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), Buckles and
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Hungerman (2013)]. In a companion paper [Torun and Tumen (2015)], we clearly document
the relevance of this concern for micro-level data sets in Turkey. When this is the case,
the cutoff date accidentally captures the family background effects; therefore, RDD exercises
performed within narrowly defined windows will likely suffer from large biases due to the
season-of-birth effects. The following empirical strategies are designed having this problem in
mind.
OLS. Our first specification is the standard OLS based on the following equation:
yi,r,t,m,s = α + δ ·Bi + θ′ ·Xi + g(t) + fr + fs + fm + i,r,t,s,m, (4.1)
where i, r, t, m, and s index individuals, regions, years of birth, months of birth, and survey
years, respectively, y is the labor market outcome of interest, B is a dummy variable taking 1
if the individual is born on or before December 31st and 0 after December 31st, X is a vector
of individual-level characteristics, g(t) is a polynomial defining the time trend variable with
respect to the year of birth, fr denotes region fixed effects, fs denotes survey-year fixed effects,
fm denotes month-of-birth fixed effects, and  is an error term. The vector of individual-level
characteristics, X, includes a full set of age dummies and an urban/rural dummy. Variables
such as education, experience, and marital status are not used as regressors, because these
variables are “outcomes” and are influenced by the individual’s decisions related to the timing
of the compulsory military service. Finally, to represent the time trend that could emanate
from birth years, we use a cubic specification. Using alternative specifications do not alter the
results.
Figure (1) visualizes our empirical design. We focus on four different windows of observation.
The shortest one makes a comparison among the ones born in 1972 versus 1973.8 The size-2
window compares the outcomes of those born in 1971–1972 to the outcomes of the ones born
in 1973–1974. The size-3 window compares the outcomes of those born in 1970–1972 to the
outcomes of the ones born in 1973–1975. Finally, the largest window performs a comparison
8Note that the analysis in the small window may not directly give use the impact of the paid exemption reform. The coefficient
δ yields the combined effect of the paid-exemption reform and a simple cohort effect. To overcome this problem, we enlarge the
windows and include the year of birth trends to disentangle the effect of the reform from the cohort effects.
13
Survey Year 27/28 28/29 29/30 30/31 31/32 32/33 33/34 34/35 35/36 36/37 37/38 38/39 39/40 40/41 41/42 42/43 43/44
2004 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2005 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2006 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2007 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2008 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2009 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2010 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2011 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969
2012 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969









Figure 1: Estimation design. A visual representation.
between 1969–1972 and 1973–1976. The outcomes of interest are school attainment, earnings,
labor force participation, employment, and unemployment. We report the results at three
stages. At the first stage, we perform the regressions for males. At the second stage, the same
analyses are performed for females. Finally, the regressions are performed for males based
on placebo treatment dates. Since compulsory military service is binding only for males, we
expect to see no effect on females as a consequence of the paid exemption reform. We also
expect to see no effect for placebo treatment dates.
Difference in differences. Next, we design a difference-in-differences strategy to check
the robustness of the estimates obtained with OLS. The main motivation is as follows. The
basic OLS estimations make direct comparisons across entire years. A more refined strategy
would set narrower analysis windows defined in terms of the month-of-birth variable and,
in such a case, the natural candidate for the estimation strategy is an RDD. However, as
we explain above, although the reform date is set exogenously, it is likely to capture family
background effects that can be correlated with season of birth. One potential solution to
avoid this problem is to perform a DID estimation. We set a window defined over months of
birth, say, 1 September 1972 – 30 April 1973. In this example, the window of analysis is 8
months symmetrically centered around the reform date 31 December 1972. To overcome the
confounding season of birth effects, it is necessary to compare the change in the labor market
outcomes of eligible males born in this interval to the change in the labor market outcomes of
the males born in the control interval defined as 1 September 1973 – 30 April 1974. In other
14
words, we make a comparison across birth months and across year-of-birth periods. The main
identifying assumption here is that the season of birth effects are the same across these two
windows. Our DID specification can be written as follows:
yi,r,m,s = α + β · Ti + δ ·Bi × Ti + θ′ ·Xi + fr + fs + fm + i,r,s,m, (4.2)
where the dummy variable T takes the value 1 if the year-of-birth period is 1972–1973 and 0 if
it is 1973–1974. The other variables are defined as above. The main parameter of interest is δ.
Note that the variable B is omitted from the regression since we also include the month-of-birth
dummies.
In our empirical analysis, we perform this DID exercise for males over three different windows:
(i) 8-month window defined as the birth-date interval 1 September 1972 – 30 April 1973,
(ii) 10-month window defined as the birth-date interval 1 August 1972 – 31 May 1973, and
(iii) 12-month window defined as the birth-date interval 1 July 1972 – 30 June 1973. For
robustness purposes, we also perform the DID analysis for females. Again, since the paid
exemption reform is only expected to affect the outcomes of males, the DID estimation for
females should not produce any impact.
Triple difference. Finally, we add a further layer to the DID exercise described above
by formally introducing females into the analysis. So, the regression analysis now performs
comparisons across birth months, across years of birth, and across gender categories. This is
very similar to triple difference analysis performed by Di Pietro (2013). Since the compulsory
military service is only expected to affect the outcomes of males, it might be interesting to
set females as the baseline group and perform comparisons accordingly. The DID and triple
difference analyses complement each other in the sense that the former shows whether we
actually see an effect for males, while the latter shows the effect relative to an unaffected
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group, females. Our triple difference equation can be simply written as
yi,r,m,s = α + ψ ·Mi + β · Ti + ξ · Ti ×Mi + φ ·Bi ×Mi + γ ·Bi × Ti
+ δ ·Bi × Ti ×Mi + θ′ ·Xi + fr + fs + fm + i,r,s,m, (4.3)
where M is a dummy variable taking 1 if the individual is male and 0 if female. All the other
variables are defined as above. Our main parameter of interest in this specification is, again,
δ.
5 Results and Discussion
In the previous sections, we explain that a four-year college degree allows young males to
perform a more preferable military service. For that reason, the compulsory military service
in Turkey provides an extra incentive for males to attend college, whereas females are not
affected by these regulations. In this section, we empirically examine whether this hypothesis
is correct. If so, we expect the paid exemption law to reduce the college graduation rates
among males who are eligible to benefit from the 1999 law compared to those who cannot
benefit. We implement three different empirical strategies to investigate the effect of paid-
exemption law on school attainment and real earnings. Then, we perform robustness checks
using the same three strategies and show that paid exemption law do not have any effect on
females and, furthermore, placebo cutoff dates do not yield any meaningful results.
First, we estimate the regression Equation (4.1). Table (2) shows the estimated effect of paid
exemption reform on school attainment of males. The sample includes males born around
the cutoff date, December 31, 1972, from survey years 2004–2013. The dependent variable is
the years of completed education in the first three columns and a binary indicator that takes
the value 1 for four-year college graduates and zero otherwise in the last three columns. The
empirical model in the first and the fifth columns basically compares the school attainment
of those who were born in 1972 to those who were born in 1973. We find that males born in
1972 have 0.26 years of education less than males born in 1973. We also find that the former
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group is less likely to have a college degree by 1.7 percentage points. Yet, this estimate is a
combination of cohort effect and the treatment effect. For example, if there is an upward trend
in school attainment across cohorts, then a decline with the magnitude 0.26 years will be a
biased estimate. For that reason, we include more cohorts in the second, third, and fourth
columns; the year-of-birth intervals 1971–1974, 1970–1975, and 1969–1976, respectively. As
we have several consecutive cohorts in the sample, we also control for the trends in the year
of birth. We still find negative and statistically significant estimates in the second, third, and
fourth columns. Yet, the estimate in the sample with eight cohorts goes down to a decline
by 0.10 years of education due to the paid exemption reform. The sixth, seventh, and eighth
columns confirm the negative effect of the law on college attainment.
Theoretically speaking, the net effect of the paid exemption law on individual earnings is
ambiguous. As the paid exemption reduces the college attainment of young males, it may also
reduce their earnings. On the other hand, those who benefit from the law do not suffer from the
human capital depreciation as much as those who serve for 9 months or 18 months. Therefore,
the net effect on the earnings is an empirical question. Table (3) shows the estimated effect
of the paid exemption law on the real earnings of males. The structure of Table (3) is the
same as Table (2) except that the last four columns restrict the sample to those with high
school degree or above. In the first three columns, all estimates are negative and statistically
significant. Yet, the estimated effect is very small and statistically insignificant in the fourth
column. When we restrict the sample to those with high school degree or above, the estimates
are not statistically significant. In Tables (4)–(6), we also examine the effect of the paid
exemption law on employment status of young males. The sample includes males born around
the cutoff date, December 31, 1972, from survey years 2004–2013. The dependent variable is
a binary indicator for employment, unemployment, and labor force participation respectively.
We do not find any significant effect of the law on any of these outcomes.
Next, using the same empirical methodology, we perform two placebo exercises. First, we
repeat the previous two estimations for females. Since the regulations of military service do
not provide any incentive for females, we do not expect the paid exemption law to affect their
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school attainments or wages. Table (7) shows that the paid exemption law does not have a
statistically meaningful affect on the school attainment of females who were born in 1972 or
before compared to females born on or after 1973. Similarly, we do not find any significant
effect on real earnings of females in Table (8).
In Table (9), we set two different placebo treatment dates rather than the original one. The
upper panel sets December 31, 1977 as the placebo cutoff date. Then for 2, 4, 6, and 8-
year windows, using the regression Equation (4.1), we estimate the effect of being born before
December 31, 1977 on school attainment and log real earnings. We do not find any statistically
significant effect except for the first column—which may be due to cohort effect. Similarly,
in the lower panel, we set December 31, 1978 as the placebo cutoff date. Again, we fail to
find any meaningful effect of the placebo treatment. These two placebo exercises suggest the
results in Table (2) and Table (3) are not driven by the estimation methodology.
Second, we apply the difference-in-differences strategy and estimate the regression Equation
(4.2) for the same outcomes as above. In this econometric model, instead of controlling for
year-of-birth trends, we focus on a very narrow window around the cutoff date December 31,
1972. We could basically compare the education and labor market outcomes of those who
were born right before the cutoff date to those who were born right after the cutoff date in
multiple survey years. Yet, the difference between the two groups may reflect the season of
birth effects. Torun and Tumen (2015) show that individuals born in the last quarter of a
year have higher education levels and better labor market outcomes than those born in the
first quarter of the year. In order to incorporate this season of birth effects, we use males born
around 31 December 1973 as the control group. The main identifying assumption is that the
season-of-birth effects are the same across these two periods.
Table (10) shows the estimated effect of the paid exemption law on the school attainment of
males. For all sample specifications, we find that males who were born in the late 1972 have
0.13–0.19 years of education less than males born in early 1973, after controlling for the season-
of-birth trends. The last three columns show that the law reduces the college attainment by
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1.0–1.8 percentage points among males. Table (11) shows the estimated effect on real earnings
of males using the difference-in-differences strategy. The estimates are all negative in the first
three columns, albeit being statistically insignificant. When we restrict the sample to those
with a high school degree and above, the estimated effect on the real earnings is again negative
and statistically insignificant.
Table (12) shows that the paid-exemption law does not affect the school attainment of females
who were born in late 1972 in a statistically meaningful manner compared to females born
in early 1973. Similarly, in Table (13), we do not find any significant effect on real earn-
ings of females using the same difference-in-differences strategy. Overall, the results from the
difference-in-differences strategy are very similar to those from the regression Equation (4.1).
We find negative effect of the paid exemption law on educational attainment, college atten-
dance in particular. We also find suggestive evidence that the law reduces the real earnings
of males through the decline in college attendance.
Finally, we perform a triple-difference estimation by adding another layer to the difference-in-
differences estimation via incorporating females into the analysis. Remember that, in the DID
methodology described above, males born around December 31, 1972 constitute the treatment
group. Then, we incorporate males born around December 31, 1973 as the control group and
we assume that the season of birth effects are the same across two groups.9 Now, we relax
this assumption too. We allow the season of birth effects to change across two groups. Yet,
we assume that the change in the season of birth effects across two groups is the same among
males and females. Tables (14) and (15) estimate the regression Equation (4.3) and document
the estimated effect of the law on school attainment and log real earnings of males using a triple
difference strategy. The results are very much in line with those from the previous regression
models. The paid exemption law reduces education of males by 0.16–0.25 years among males,
and their likelihood of college degree attainment by 1.4 percentage points. Table (15) presents
suggestive evidence that the law reduced the real earnings of males slightly, if any.
9In other words, we assume that, in the absence of the law, the difference in socio-economic conditions between males born in
late 1972 and early 1973 would be the same as the difference between males born in late 1973 and early 1974. This is the common
trends assumption typically used in DID estimations.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the impact of a reform that allows for paid exemption from compulsory
military service on the schooling and labor market outcomes of the eligible males in Turkey.
The paid exemption option is provided to men—with a law enacted in November 1999—who
were born on or before December 31, 1972. The ones who were born on January 1, 1973 or after
are ineligible. This natural experiment enables us to set up an empirical design to estimate
the impact of the paid exemption reform on the educational and labor market outcomes of
the eligible men. Since we do not exactly know who have benefited from the reform, our
estimates should be interpreted as the “intention-to-treat” effect—as the empirical analysis is
constructed based on the initial assignment of the treatment, not on the treatment eventually
received.
Compulsory military service imposes certain restrictions on the education and employment
decisions of young men. This is especially a concern for the countries in which the duration
of service is typically long—such as Turkey. The empirical exercise we perform allows us
to understand, at least partially, how compulsory military service affects education and labor
market outcomes. We find that the paid exemption reform reduces the educational attainment
for the eligible men. In particular, it reduces the probability of receiving a college degree or
above. This suggests that compulsory military service provides incentives to stay enrolled in
college. We also find that there is a suggestive decline in the labor market earnings of eligible
men. We conjecture that the decline in earnings is associated with the decline in educational
attainment.
Taken at face value, our findings suggest that removing the compulsory service in Turkey
will likely reduce educational attainment for those who stay enrolled to defer their military
obligation. This is in line with Maurin and Xenogiani (2007), who show that the abolition
of compulsory military service in France led to a reduction in educational attainment among
males and, consequently, in earnings. In a similar spirit, our findings suggest that part of
the males who are born on or after the reform cutoff—i.e., January 1, 1973—would have left
20
school if they were also eligible for paid exemption.
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A Data Appendix
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the concepts we have defined throughout
the paper as well as the variables we have used in the regressions.
General Definitions:
• Reform cutoff date: The paid exemption reform has a cutoff defined in terms of birth
date. Specifically, males born on or before December 31, 1972 are eligible for the reform,
while those born on or after January 1, 1973 are ineligible.
• Analysis window: To perform an empirical comparison between the eligible versus
ineligible males, we set alternative analysis windows centered around the cutoff date.
The OLS analysis sets the windows in terms of the year-of-birth variable. As Figure
(1) describes, the small, medium, and large windows are set as 1972–1973, 1971–1974,
and 1970–1975. The DID and triple difference analyses center the windows around the
cutoff date in terms of the month-of-birth variable. These smaller windows are symmet-
rically defined around the cutoff date as 8-month, 10-month, and 12-month intervals. For
example, the 8-month interval is set as September 1972–April 1973.
• Before the cutoff (B = 1): The treatment group includes males born on or before
December 31. These are the males who are eligible to benefit from the paid exemption
reform.
• After the cutoff (B = 0): The control group includes males born on or after January
1. These are the ineligible males.
• Treatment period (T = 1): This variable is used in the DID and triple difference
analyses. It is defined in terms of the year-of-birth variable and includes the ones who
are born between July 1, 1972 and June 30, 1973.
• Control period (T = 0): It includes the ones who are born between July 1, 1973 and
June 30, 1974.
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• Gender (M): The gender variable is defined as the dummy variable M taking 1 if the
individual is a male and 0 if female.
• Reform effect (DID) (B×T ): This is the variable that we use in the DID regressions
to identify the intention-to-treat effect of the paid-exemption reform on the educational
and labor market outcomes of the eligible males. The cross product reflects the usual
spirit of the difference-in-differences approach.
• Reform effect (triple difference) (B×T ×M): This is the variable that we use in the
triple-difference regressions to identify the intention-to-treat effect of the paid-exemption
reform on the educational and labor market outcomes of the eligible males in comparison
to the outcomes of females.
• Unemployment: Unemployment is described by a dummy variable taking 1 if the
worker is not working but actively seeking for a job and 0 otherwise. Notice that this
variable describes the unemployment-to-population ratio, rather than the traditional un-
employment rate.
• Employment: Employment is described by a dummy variable taking 1 if the worker is
employed and 0 otherwise. This variable describes the employment-to-population ratio.
• Labor force participation: The labor force participation variable is described by a
dummy variable taking 1 if the worker is either unemployed or employed, and 0 if the
worker is not in labor force.
• Years of schooling: The education variable is described in 6 categories in the Turkish
Household Labor Force Survey: 1 – no degree, 2 – primary school, 3 – middle school, 4 –
high school, 5 – vocational high school, and 6 – college or above. In the paper, we define
the years of schooling variable by setting categories (1,2) as 5 years, 3 as 8 years, (4,5) as
11 years, and 6 as 15 years. Note that this variable describes the years of “completed”
education. The estimation is robust to the alternative calculations of years of schooling.
• College and above: We define this variable as a dummy taking 1 if the education
category is 6 and 0 otherwise. It includes those who have two-year college degrees and
23
graduate degrees. So, we cannot distinguish between two-year college graduates, four-year
college graduates, and the ones with graduate-level degrees.
• Urban/rural status: Whether the worker resides in an urban versus rural area is
described by a dummy variable taking 1 if the worker lives in an urban area and 0
otherwise. In the survey, an urban area defined as a residential area with population size
above 20,000.
• Trend: The time trend variable used in the OLS regressions are defined as the “year-
of-birth” trends. It captures the trends in educational attainment and labor market
outcomes across birth-year cohorts. We also include a quadratic term to capture possible
non-linearities.
• Real earnings: The earnings variable describes the worker’s monthly earnings including
the monthly salary plus bonuses, performance pays, overtime pays earned in the corre-
sponding month. The nominal earnings is deflated (taking 2004 as the base year) via the
official CPI figures to generate real earnings.
Other general variables that do not need any description include age, region (NUTS2), and
survey year dummies for 2004–2013.
24
References
Angrist, J. D. (1990): “Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence
from Social Security Administrative Records,” American Economic Review, 80, 313–336.
——— (1993): “The Effect of Veterans Benefits on Education and Earnings,” Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 46, 637–652.
Angrist, J. D. and S. H. Chen (2011): “Schooling and the Vietnam-Era GI Bill: Evidence
from the Draft Lottery,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 96–118.
Angrist, J. D., S. H. Chen, and J. Song (2011): “Long-Term Consequences of Vietnam-
Era Conscription: New Estimates Using Social Security Data,” American Economic Review,
101, 334–38.
Angrist, J. D. and A. B. Krueger (1991): “Does Compulsory Schooling Attendance
Affect Schooling and Earnings?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 976–1014.
——— (1994): “Why do World War II Veterans Earn More than Nonveterans?” Journal of
Labor Economics, 12, 74–97.
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke (2008): Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s
Companion, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Autor, D., M. G. Duggan, and D. S. Lyle (2011): “Battle Scars? The Puzzling Decline
in Employment and Rise in Disability Receipt among Vietnam Era Veterans,” American
Economic Review, 101, 339–344.
Barr, A. (2014): “From the Battlefield to the Schoolyard: The Impact of the Post-9/11 GI
Bill,” Forthcoming, Journal of Human Resources.
Bauer, T. K., S. Bender, A. R. Paloyo, and C. M. Schmidt (2012): “Evaluating
the Labor-Market Effects of Compulsory Military Service,” European Economic Review, 56,
814–829.
25
Bedard, K. and O. Deschenes (2006): “The Long-Term Impact of Military Service on
Health: Evidence from World War II and Korean War Veterans,” American Economic
Review, 96, 176–194.
Bloom, H. S. (2008): “The Core Analytics of Randomized Experiments for Social Research,”
in The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods, ed. by P. Alasuutari, L. Bickman, and
J. Brannen, London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd., chap. 115–134.
Bound, J., D. A. Jaeger, and R. M. Baker (1995): “Problems with Instrumental
Variables Estimation when the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous
Explanatory Variable is Weak,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90, 443–
450.
Bound, J. and S. Turner (2002): “Going to War and Going to College: Did World War
II and the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning Veterans?” Journal of
Labor Economics, 20, 783–815.
Buckles, K. S. and D. M. Hungerman (2013): “Season of Birth and Later Outcomes:
Old Questions, New Answers,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, 711–724.
Card, D. and A. R. Cardoso (2009): “Can Compulsory Military Service Raise Civilian
Wages? Evidence from the Peacetime Draft in Portugal,” American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 4, 57–93.
Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001): “Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The Unintended
Legacy of the Vietnam War,” American Economic Review, 91, 97–102.
De Tray, D. N. (1982): “Veteran Status as a Screening Device,” American Economic
Review, 72, 133–142.
Di Pietro, G. (2013): “Military Conscription and University Enrolment: Evidence from
Italy,” Journal of Population Economics, 26, 619–644.
Dobkin, C. and R. Shabani (2009): “The Health Effects of Military Service: Evidence
from the Vietnam Draft,” Economic Inquiry, 47, 69–80.
26
Fisher, L. D., D. O. Dixon, J. Herson, R. K. Frankowski, M. S. Hearron, and
K. E. Peace (1990): “Intention to Treat in Clinical Trials,” in Statistical Issues in Drug
Research and Development, ed. by K. E. Peace, New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, 331–350.
Galiani, S., M. A. Rossi, and E. Schargrodsky (2011): “Conscription and Crime: Evi-
dence from the Argentine Draft Lottery,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
3, 119–136.
Grenet, J., R. A. Hart, and J. E. Roberts (2011): “Above and Beyond the Call: Long-
term Real Earnings Effects of British Male Military Conscription in the Post-war Years,”
Labour Economics, 18, 194–204.
Hennekens, C. H., J. E. Buring, and S. L. Mayrent (1987): Epidemiology in Medicine,
Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
Imbens, G. W. and W. van der Klaauw (1995): “Evaluating the Cost of Conscription
in The Netherlands,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 13, 207–215.
Maurin, E. and T. Xenogiani (2007): “Demand for Education and Labor Market Out-
comes: Lessons from the Abolition of Compulsory Conscription in France,” Journal of
Human Resources, 42, 795–819.
Simon, C. J., S. Negrusa, and J. T. Warner (2010): “Educational Benefits and Military
Service: An Analysis of Enlistment, Reenlistment, and Veterans’ Benefit Usage 1991–2005,”
Economic Inquiry, 48, 1008–1031.
Torun, H. (2014): “Ex-Ante Labor Market Effects of Compulsory Military Service,” Un-
published manuscript, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
Torun, H. and S. Tumen (2015): “The Empirical Content of Season-of-Birth Effects: An






Years of schooling 8.25 6.97
No degree 0.04 0.14
Primary school 0.46 0.56
Middle school 0.13 0.07
High school 0.11 0.08
Vocational high school 0.11 0.06
College and above 0.15 0.09
Real Earnings 700.75 694.35
Employed 0.87 0.31
Unemployed 0.08 0.03
Not in labor force 0.05 0.66
Sample share 48.06 51.94
# of observations 264,303 285,669
Table 1: Summary Statistics. This table reports the means of the key variables used in our analysis by
gender category. The real earnings are denominated in 2004 Turkish Liras. Our data comes from the survey
years 2004–2013. We restrict attention to the ones who were born between 1969–1976. The age range of the
sample is 27–44 for both males and females. These are prime-age individuals; thus, the degree of labor market
attachment is high relative to the other age groups, especially among males. The labor market variables
(employed, unemployed, and not in labor force) are defined relative to the relevant population. In particular,
“unemployed” is defined as the fraction of unemployed individuals in the population, rather than the rate of
unemployment. The total number of observations is 549,972.
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